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 Presidential addresses to the American Economic Association are always notable events. 
They are given by scholars of great repute who, by virtue of their office, are being honored by 
the broad economics profession. The talks are attended by large crowds at the annual AEA 
meeting. They are prominently published as the lead article in an issue of the American 
Economic Review, one of the discipline’s most widely read journals. It is no surprise, therefore, 
that these addresses often play a significant part in the evolution of the field. 
 Milton Friedman’s presidential address, “The Role of Monetary Policy,” which was 
delivered 50 years ago in December 1967 and published in the March 1968 issue of the 
American Economic Review, is nonetheless unusual in the outsized role it has played. Citation 
counts offer one measure of its influence. As of this writing, the article has been cited more than 
7,500 times according to Google Scholar, making it the third most-cited presidential address in 
AEA history, beaten only by the addresses of Simon Kuznets on “Economic Growth and Income 
Inequality” (delivered in 1954, published in 1955) and Theodore Schultz on “Investment in 
Human Capital” (delivered in 1960, published in 1961). Friedman’s address is cited less than his 
1962 book Capitalism and Freedom and less than a brief essay he wrote in The New York Times 
Magazine in 1970, “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits.” But the 
citation count for Friedman’s presidential address is roughly on par with the 1963 A Monetary 
History of the United States by Friedman and Anna Schwartz. Aside from these, it is cited more 
often than anything else Friedman wrote during his long, prolific, and influential career. 
 What explains the huge influence of this work, merely 17 pages in length? One factor is 
that Friedman addresses an important topic. Another is that it is written in simple, clear prose, 
making it an ideal addition to the reading lists of many courses. But these same points can be 
made for many other AEA presidential addresses. What distinguishes Friedman’s address is that 
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it invites readers to fundamentally reorient their thinking. It was an invitation that, after hearing 
the arguments, many readers chose to accept. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to view Friedman’s 
1967 AEA presidential address as marking a turning point in the history of macroeconomic 
research. 
 Our goal here is to assess this contribution, with the benefit of a half century of hindsight.  
We discuss where macroeconomics was before the address, what insights Friedman offered, 
where researchers and central bankers stand today on these issues, and (most speculatively) 
where we may be heading in the future. We focus on the presidential address alone, putting aside 
Friedman’s many other contributions (see Nelson 2017).  
  
Macroeconomics before the Address 
 
Let’s start by setting the stage. When Friedman gave his address in 1967, one author of 
the present essay was in grade school and the other was not yet born, so neither of us can claim 
first-hand experience. But using the historical record, only a little imagination is needed to get a 
sense of what was occupying the thoughts of most macroeconomists as Friedman walked to the 
podium. 
There seems little doubt that the focal event for macroeconomists of that era was still the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. By the late 1960s the Depression, rather than being a recent 
event, had started to fade into history. (To put it in perspective, the Depression was then about as 
current as the presidency of Ronald Reagan is today.) But many of the macroeconomists 
listening to Friedman, especially the more senior ones, had lived through this historic downturn, 
and it was often the motivating event of their professional lives. 
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That was surely true for Friedman. In his contribution to the wonderful collection Lives of 
Laureates (edited by Breit and Hirsch 2004), Friedman wrote (pp. 69-70),  
 
“I graduated from college in 1932, when the United States was at the bottom of the 
deepest depression in its history before or since. The dominant problem of the time was 
economics.  How to get out of the depression? How to reduce unemployment? What 
explained the paradox of great need on the one hand and unused resources on the other? 
Under the circumstances, becoming an economist seemed more relevant to the burning 
issues of the day than becoming an applied mathematician or an actuary.” 
 
Today, we can say with confidence that the world is a better place for Milton Friedman having 
forgone the opportunity to become an actuary! 
 In the decades after Friedman graduated from college, economists slowly developed an 
understanding of how to view fluctuations. That understanding was founded on John Maynard 
Keynes’s landmark book The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Keynes’s 
vision was clarified and simplified—some would say oversimplified—in the work of Hicks 
(1937) and Hansen (1953). Their IS-LM model provided the benchmark theory for explaining 
how insufficient aggregate demand led to economic downturns, as well as how monetary and 
fiscal policy could combat those downturns. It also provided the starting point for larger 
econometric models used for forecasting and policy analysis, such as the Federal Reserve’s MPS 
model, work on which began in 1966 under the leadership of Franco Modigliani, Albert Ando, 
and Frank de Leeuw.  The name MPS is derived from MIT, University of Pennsylvania, and 
Social Science Research Council (Brayton, Levin, Tryon, and Williams 1997).   
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The IS-LM model takes the price level as given, which is perhaps a reasonable 
assumption in the shortest of short runs, but the economists of that era were also concerned about 
the forces that led the price level to change over time. One important reference is the 1960 paper 
by Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow, “Analytical Aspects of Anti-Inflation Policy.” Samuelson 
and Solow discuss the many forces that influence inflation, emphasizing the difficulty of 
identifying whether any rise in inflation is driven by an increase in costs or an increase in 
demand.  Yet their essay is best remembered for its emphasis on the Phillips curve as a useful 
addition to the macroeconomist’s toolbox. Friedman does not cite this paper in his presidential 
address, but it is nonetheless representative of the worldview which many mainstream 
macroeconomists had adopted and to which Friedman was responding. 
 Samuelson and Solow (1960, p. 192) presented the Phillips curve as “the menu of choice 
between different degrees of unemployment and price stability.” While the idea of such a menu 
was their main thrust, they recognized the possibility that it might not be stable over time.  In 
particular, they discussed various ways in which a low-pressure economy—one with low 
inflation and high unemployment —might shift the Phillips curve over time. On the one hand, “it 
might be that the low-pressure demand would so act upon wage and other expectations as to shift 
the curve downward in the longer run.” (p. 193) On the other hand, a “low-pressure economy 
might build up within itself over the years larger and larger amounts of structural 
unemployment,” resulting in “an upward shift of our menu of choice.” (p. 193) Thus, Samuelson 
and Solow anticipated what would later be known as the expectation-augmented Phillips curve 
and hysteresis effects (the possibility of long-lasting increases in unemployment after a 
recession). But these effects were considered caveats to their main analysis, rather than central to 
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it.  For most readers of their paper, the main take-away was the Phillips curve as a menu of 
outcomes available to policymakers, both in the short run and in the long run. 
  
The Key Insights 
 
 Enter Milton Friedman’s AEA presidential address in December 1967, only a few years 
after he and Anna Schwartz had published their Monetary History. Though written by someone 
who had immersed himself in monetary history, he did not use this opportunity to review the 
historical record. Instead, the address is largely a work of monetary theory, aimed at providing a 
big picture view of the potential and limits of monetary policy. It is worth noting that Friedman’s 
perspective echoes certain ideas presented, roughly concurrently, by Edmund Phelps (1967, 
1968). It is unclear to us whether Friedman was aware of Phelps’s work in this area or, more 
likely in light of the fact that neither cited the other, whether these two great scholars were led in 
the same direction by the intellectual climate of the time.  
 One major theme of Friedman’s (1968) address is its focus on the behavior of the 
economy in the long run. Samuelson and Solow (1960) seemed to view the long run as merely 
the consequence of a series of Keynesian short runs. In contrast, Friedman viewed the long run 
as the time frame under which we should apply the principles of classical economics, especially 
monetary neutrality. Regardless of what the central bank did, unemployment would over time 
approach its natural rate, which he defined (p. 8) as “the level that would be ground out by the 
Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations, provided there is imbedded in them the 
actual structural characteristics of labor and commodity markets, including market imperfections, 
stochastic variability in demands and supplies, the cost of gathering information about job 
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vacancies and labor availability, the costs of mobility, and so on.” This understanding of how the 
economy worked in the long run provided the basis for, and restrictions on, how we tried to 
understand the behavior of the economy in the short run.  
 A second and related major theme of Friedman’s (1968) address is its focus on 
expectations. As noted, Samuelson and Solow (1960) had previously mentioned the role of 
expectations, and they understood that it might distinguish the short run from the long run. But 
this was not their main concern, and they attached no particular significance to whether actual 
and expected inflation are the same. By contrast, for Friedman, expectations were the key to 
explaining how the economy might appear to face a Phillips curve tradeoff and how that tradeoff 
would disappear if we tried to exploit it. He wrote (p. 11) that “there is always a temporary trade-
off between inflation and unemployment; there is no permanent tradeoff. The temporary trade-
off comes not from inflation per se, but from unanticipated inflation, which generally means, 
from a rising rate of inflation.” The deviation of reality from expectations was what permitted the 
economy to depart from its classical benchmark. But because over time people catch on to what 
is happening, expectations and reality must eventually come into line, ensuring that these 
departures are only transitory. 
 Friedman’s focus on the long run and his emphasis on expectations are closely connected. 
In some macroeconomic models, the long run is the time horizon over which nominal wages and 
prices can overcome their short-run stickiness, allowing the economy to return to its classical 
equilibrium. Friedman, instead, viewed the long run as the time horizon over which people 
become better informed and so their expectations align with reality. 
 By bringing expectations to the center of the story, Friedman’s address helped to usher in 
the rational expectations revolution that followed. Influential articles in the 1970s by Lucas 
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(1972), Sargent and Wallace (1975), and Barro (1977) were built on the conceptual foundation 
that Friedman had put in place. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that Friedman gave no hint that he 
thought expectations were as rational as these later authors would assume. Indeed, his emphasis 
on unanticipated inflation, along with his judgment that it took “something like two to five 
years” (p. 11) for the real effects to dissipate, suggests that he thought expectations were slow to 
adapt to changes in the policy environment. While it is possible that he had some other 
propagation mechanism in mind to explain these persistent effects, the address is most naturally 
read through the lens of old-fashioned adaptive expectations. From a modern perspective, 
Friedman’s assumption that expectations are sluggish rather than rational seems prescient. As we 
will discuss shortly, recent research on how people form expectations has moved in this 
direction. 
 
Implications for Monetary Policy 
 
 Using these themes of the classical long run and the centrality of expectations, Friedman 
takes on policy questions with a simple bifurcation: what monetary policy cannot do and what 
monetary policy can do. It is a division that remains useful today (even though, as we discuss 
later, modern macroeconomists might include different items on each list). 
 Friedman begins with what monetary policy cannot do. He emphasizes that, except in the 
short run, the central bank cannot peg either interest rates or the unemployment rate. The 
argument regarding the unemployment rate is that the tradeoff described by the Phillips curve is 
transitory, unemployment must eventually return to its natural rate, and so any attempt by the 
central bank to achieve otherwise will put inflation into an unstable spiral. The argument 
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regarding interest rates is similar: Because we can never know with much precision what the 
natural rate of interest is, any attempt to peg interest rates will also likely lead to inflation getting 
out of control. From a modern perspective, it is noteworthy that Friedman does not consider the 
possibility of feedback rules for interest rates, which today we call “Taylor rules” (Taylor 1993).  
When Friedman turns to what monetary policy can do, he says (p. 12) that the “first and 
most important lesson” is that “monetary policy can prevent money itself from being a major 
source of economic disturbance.” Here we see the profound influence of his work with Anna 
Schwartz, especially their Monetary History of the United States. From their perspective, history 
is replete with examples of erroneous central bank actions and their consequences. The severity 
of the Great Depression is a case in point. 
It is significant that, while Friedman is often portrayed as an advocate for passive 
monetary policy, he is not dogmatic on this point. He notes that “monetary policy can contribute 
to offsetting major disturbances in the economic system arising from other sources” (p. 14). 
Fiscal policy, in particular, is mentioned as one of these other disturbances. Yet he cautions that 
this activist role should not be taken too far, in light of our limited ability to recognize shocks 
and gauge their magnitude in a timely fashion. 
 The final section of Friedman’s presidential address concerns the conduct of monetary 
policy. He argues that the primary focus should be on something the central bank can control in 
the long run, that is, a nominal variable. He considers the nominal exchange rate, the price level, 
and monetary aggregates. He says that the exchange rate is not sufficiently important, given the 
small role of trade in the US economy. While the price level is the most important of these 
variables, he argues that the link between central bank actions and the price level is too long and 
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unpredictable for the price level to serve as a useful policy target. He concludes that steady 
growth in some monetary aggregate is the best starting point for policy. 
This last recommendation may be the part of Friedman’s analysis with which 
macroeconomists today would most strongly disagree (see Hetzel, 2017, for an exception). The 
economy is subject to many types of shocks, such as oil price changes, financial crises, and 
shifting animal spirits of investors. In many cases, simply keeping a monetary aggregate on a 
steady path seems an insufficient response to macroeconomic distress. Moreover, in a world with 
an increasingly complex array of financial instruments, determining an appropriate measure of 
the quantity of money to target is difficult and perhaps insuperable. As a result, over the past few 
decades, the ratio of nominal income to many measures of money (what is called velocity) has 
been unstable, convincing most economists and policymakers that targeting money would lead to 
large fluctuations in prices and incomes.   
 
The Current State of Play 
 
The Great Recession that followed the financial crisis of 2007-08 may become the 
defining moment for a new generation of macroeconomists, just as the Great Depression was for 
Milton Friedman’s generation. The initial contraction in production and the turmoil in financial 
markets were as serious as those in 1929. Like classical economics in the 1930s, which had been 
criticized for not explaining why so many people who wanted a job could not find one, modern 
economics was criticized for not forecasting the crash. In a visit to the London School of 
Economics, the Queen of England famously asked (as reported in Pierce 2008): “Why did 
nobody notice it?” Macroeconomics responded, and researchers have been fervently at work 
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modeling banks and financial markets, using microeconomic data to better calibrate and estimate 
models, and studying unconventional monetary policies. The current state of play is not the same 
as it was ten years ago. 
It is a testament to the reach of Friedman’s (1968) presidential address that its two main 
themes—the use of the long-run time frame and the centrality of expectations—remain integral 
to macroeconomics and have not been greatly affected by the crisis. Most classes in 
macroeconomics for more than two decades have started with the long run, as many graduate and 
undergraduate textbooks will testify. Students first learn about the Solow (or Ramsey) models for 
the evolution of real variables and then use the classical dichotomy and the Fisher equation for 
interest rates to discuss nominal variables. To be sure, there is greater heterogeneity across 
institutions and teachers about what models are introduced next. But the starting point, just as in 
Friedman’s address, is almost always a long-run classical benchmark. Keynes (1923) famously 
wrote: “The long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead.” 
But Friedman won the discussion about the relevance of the long run to current decisions, and 
economists today work through death before trying to make sense of life. 
When Friedman wrote his address, most students organized their thoughts about business 
cycles using the IS-LM model. This model gives at best a secondary role to expectations. While 
early Keynesians sometimes emphasized the animal spirits of investors, these were taken to 
reflect irrational exogenous sentiments rather than purposeful forward-looking behavior. This is 
far from the reality of modern macroeconomics. Almost all macroeconomic analyses now 
emphasize intertemporal tradeoffs, so the beliefs of economic agents about the future have 
become a crucial part of the story. Expectations remain at the forefront of macroeconomic 
analysis, just as Friedman advised. 
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In particular, modern theories of price dynamics give expected inflation a key role, and in 
doing so, they embed Friedman’s hypothesis that unemployment eventually returns to its natural 
rate, regardless of the policies pursued by the central bank. To be sure, some researchers have 
questioned this hypothesis and proposed theories of hysteresis, under which monetary policy can 
have real effects in the long run. But these arguments are the exception rather than the rule. For 
most macroeconomists, the natural-rate hypothesis remains the touchstone. 
At the same time, the current state of play is also quite different from either the adaptive 
expectations that Friedman seemed to use or the rational expectations that were at the center of 
research in the 1970s. With rational expectations, there is, as Sargent (2008) noted, a 
“communism of beliefs”: All economic agents believe the same thing, because they perfectly 
observe all the same variables and use the exact same model to combine them. This model is the 
one given to them by the omniscient model-builder. Economic theorists initially embraced this 
assumption because it offered them an elegant, model-consistent way to treat expectations. 
However, for several decades now, as expectations have become central not only to policy but 
also to research in economics, the rationality of expectations, as conventionally defined, is often 
called into question. It is common today to sit through seminars in macroeconomics and see 
presenters assume that the economic agents only imperfectly or infrequently observe some 
variables, or have limited attention, or learn according to a least-squares formula, or apply other 
heuristics that are behaviorally founded. Few in the audience wince at seeing these alternatives. 
Much like the long run, rational expectations may still be the starting point in the classroom, but 
years of research have produced more nuanced models of how people look into the future. 
Expectations are now also central in empirical work. With Justin Wolfers, the two of us 
made the point long ago that progress in studying expectations required that economists look at 
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micro data from surveys (Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers 2004). There is a rich amount of panel data 
reporting people’s survey answers to what they expect about numerous variables. While 
researchers had long looked at the average of these expectations, we emphasized that one should 
also examine disagreement across people and how it evolves over time. Moreover, researchers 
can see how individual characteristics, like age or income, might affect the accuracy of these 
expectations and how often they are updated. In the study of inflation dynamics, many active 
researchers are using these data to study which of the alternatives to rational expectations should 
supplant it as the benchmark (for example, Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2012, Malmendier and 
Nagel 2015, Andrade, Crump, Eusepi, and Moench 2016). There is not yet a consensus about 
which theory of expectations is most useful, but there is no doubt that expectations data are more 
central than ever in macroeconomics today, just as Friedman suggested they should be. 
Friedman’s analysis of macroeconomic fluctuations from the perspective of a Phillips 
curve that is anchored by the long run is also alive and well. In fact, the last decade has provided 
a new application of Friedman’s logic. Friedman predicted that the Phillips curve that had 
appeared in the data throughout the 1950s and 1960s would break down if policymakers 
followed Samuelson and Solow’s (1960) advice and started exploiting it. The stagflation of the 
1970s, when both inflation and unemployment rose, is one of the greatest successes of out-of-
sample forecasting by a macroeconomist. Soon after, macroeconomists could be split into camps 
of “freshwater” and “saltwater” varieties, in Hall’s (1976) famous characterization, depending on 
the extent to which their theories were anchored by the tenets of classical economics. Yet, by the 
start of this century, macroeconomists had again converged on a view of the tradeoff facing 
central banks that merged the short-run insights from New Keynesian economics summarized in 
Mankiw and Romer (1991) and the long-run properties of the dynamic general equilibrium 
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models of Kydland and Prescott (1982), as Blanchard (2009) described. In honor of the 
neoclassical synthesis of Samuelson and Solow, Goodfriend and King (1997) labeled this 
approach the New Neoclassical Synthesis. From this perspective, Friedman’s address can be 
viewed as a starting point for dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models (though 
Friedman might well have looked askance at some aspects of DSGE methodology). 
At the heart of this new synthesis was a Phillips curve built on the work of Taylor and 
Calvo (discussed in Taylor 2016). Firms were assumed to set prices equal to the average of their 
expected future marginal costs, but to alter prices in an infrequent and staggered way. From the 
start, however, researchers saw flaws in this Phillips curve. Ball (1994) provided a pointed 
critique of its use for policymaking: He showed that the model predicted that times of announced 
disinflation should be times of economic expansion, which was almost never true in reality. 
Because the firms that are adjusting their prices today respond strongly to future expected events, 
inflation in the model can jump without any of the inertia observed in the data.  
Models in the early 2000s attempted to remedy these problems by assuming that firms 
partially indexed their prices to lagged inflation. This approach introduced inflation inertia by 
sheer assumption. Smets and Wouters (2007) found that this model could fit the US data for the 
previous four decades reasonably well. Yet the empirical success of their model could end up 
sharing the same fate as that of Samuelson and Solow (1960). Just as Milton Friedman had done 
before, some researchers suggested that given its shaky foundations, this new Phillips curve was 
bound to break down, as soon as there was a large shock or a change in policy regime. In Ball, 
Mankiw, and Reis (2005), we pointed to “the sorry state of monetary policy analysis” and 
echoed Friedman in writing that “it is imperative that expectations be allowed to adjust to the 
new regime.” The most recent decade of data has provided yet another vindication for Milton 
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Friedman’s arguments, as the slope and location of the Phillips curve again shifted, invalidating 
previous estimates (Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2015, Blanchard 2016).  
  
The Role of Monetary Policy Today 
 
Modern macroeconomics is further from Friedman’s views regarding what monetary 
policy cannot, can, and should do. The belief that, in the long run, the central bank can do little 
about real variables is still canon for most macroeconomists, and few would suggest that 
monetary policy should have targets for labor force participation, inequality, or the long-term 
real interest rate. Yet, it is not uncommon today to hear central bankers pontificate in speeches 
about such issues. Friedman’s example that a speech or article about monetary policy should 
spend almost as much space on what the central bank cannot do, as it does on what it can do, has 
eroded over time. 
While Friedman favored targeting the growth rate of a monetary aggregate, 
macroeconomists have for the last two decades instead embraced targets for inflation given to 
independent central banks (Svensson 2010). The major central banks in the developed economies 
of the world today all share not just a target for inflation but even a specific number, namely 2 
percent, differing only in how strictly and quickly they strive to achieve it. Friedman worried that 
it would be hard to hit any target for prices, yet the track record so far has been quite successful, 
with annual inflation almost never straying from the band between 0 and 4 percent. For the 
central bank with the strictest target, the European Central Bank, the price level at the end of 
2016 was 38 percent higher than it had been at the end of 1998, when the ECB started 
operations. An exact target of 2 percent per year would have predicted a 42 percent increase. The 
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annualized deviation from target averages a mere 0.2 percent over this 18-year period for the 
ECB, a success that Friedman was skeptical could be achieved.  
Modern macroeconomics also focuses more on the nominal interest rate than on 
monetary aggregates, both as an instrument for policy and as a guide to the state of the economy. 
Friedman’s presidential address discussed Knut Wicksell’s concept of a natural rate of interest 
but dismissed it as a good guide for policy. Today and for many years now, Friedman has lost 
this argument to Woodford (2003), who convinced academics and central bankers to embrace the 
Wicksellian use of interest rates as the main policy tool and their deviation from natural rates as 
the key policy target. The central bank directly controls one interest rate, and the effect of its 
actions on other interest rates is measured more reliably than the effect on money. Moreover, 
there is a clear link from interest rates to the price of credit and to the willingness of people to 
save or borrow. In the FAQ section of its website (at 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money_12845.htm), the Federal Reserve unequivocally 
states that “the importance of the money supply as a guide for the conduct of monetary policy in 
the United States has diminished over time.” 
Friedman recommended strict rules to guide monetary policy because he thought that 
deviating from such rules added noise into the system, leading to inefficient fluctuations in 
inflation and the real economy. Many modern macroeconomists seem to agree, given the paucity 
of academic or applied arguments in defense of purely discretionary choices by central bankers. 
Kehoe and Chari (2006), summarizing in this journal the modern study of commitment and the 
potential time inconsistency of discretionary policy, emphatically wrote: “The message of 
examples like these is that discretionary policy making has only costs and no benefits, so that if 
government policymakers can be made to commit to a policy rule, society should make them do 
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so.” At the same time, almost no central bank has adopted a strict rule for monetary policy, all 
continuing to use a great deal of discretion to infer the state of the economy from many imperfect 
measures, and to react to the wide variety of shocks. Instead, policymakers responded to 
academics by placing a large emphasis on the transparency of central bank actions. Central bank 
governors give frequent speeches, their institutions publish detailed reports justifying their 
actions, and academic research has taken this transparency as given, busying itself instead with 
how to shape and conduct central bank communication (Blinder et al. 2008). Such efforts at 
transparency can be seen as trying to reduce the noise arising from central bank actions. 
At the same time, modern central banks interpret inflation targets in a flexible way, with 
a willingness to trade off deviations of inflation from target against movement in real activity 
(Woodford 2010). By following feedback rules that condition policy on the state of the business 
cycle, central banks aggressively respond to recessions and booms and thus explicitly commit to 
the countercyclical stabilization policies that Friedman thought were fruitless. Gali and Gertler 
(2007) in this journal characterized the two insights of modern macroeconomic models for 
monetary policy as being: “1) the significant role of expectations of future policy actions in the 
monetary transmission mechanism and 2) the importance for the central bank of tracking the 
flexible price equilibrium values of the natural levels of output and the real interest rate.” 
Friedman would have applauded the first, but the second goes against the main thrust of the 
policy recommendations in his presidential address.  
Moreover, Friedman’s presidential address argued (p. 16) that “too late and too much has 
been the general practice” of monetary policy because of “the failure of monetary authorities to 
allow for the delay between their actions and the subsequent effects on the economy.”  Modern 
central banks agree but have responded by adopting a policy of “inflation forecast targeting” 
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(Woodford 2007): that is, they discuss their policies in terms of what will bring forecasted 
inflation two or three years ahead back on target. 
Finally, the Great Recession and the actions of the Federal Reserve provide a useful 
contrast between the central bank that Milton Friedman wished for and the one that exists today.  
Friedman (p. 14) thought that “monetary policy can contribute to offsetting major disturbances in 
the economic system arising from other sources,” but he says that “I have put this point last, and 
stated it in qualified terms—as referring to major disturbances—because I believe that the 
potentiality of monetary policy in offsetting other forces making for instability is far more 
limited than is commonly believed.” In his seminal work with Anna Schwartz, Friedman had laid 
the blame for the Great Depression on the inaction of the Federal Reserve. On Friedman’s 90th 
birthday, then-governor of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke (2002) stated, “You’re right, we 
did it. We're very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't do it again.”  
After becoming the Federal Reserve’s chair in 2006, Bernanke was put to the test in 2008 
as a financial crisis comparable to the one that triggered the Great Depression hit the US 
economy. At first, a new depression seemed imminent. But the Federal Reserve (and many other 
central banks) responded aggressively. By preventing bank failures, providing emergency credit 
to financial intermediaries, and increasing bank reserves, the central bank made sure that M2 did 
not fall as precipitously as it did during the Great Depression; Friedman would have approved. 
At the same time, the Federal Reserve kept its focus on interest rates, now expanded through 
explicit forward guidance, and persistently increased the size of its balance sheet through 
quantitative easing policies that aimed to facilitate the operation of the mortgage market. This 
array of monetary policy actions arguably prevented a financial collapse and helped the economy 
recover (Blinder 2013). By the end, the contraction lasted for 19 months and industrial output 
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fell by 17 percent from peak to trough; during the Great Depression, the comparable numbers 
were 43 months and 52 percent. At least this one time, the Federal Reserve seems to have 
successfully rebutted Friedman’s skepticism about its ability to respond to major disturbances. 
 
The Road Ahead 
 
Fifty years after Friedman’s (1968) presidential address, it is remarkable that its themes 
remain central in the study of business cycles and monetary policy. Expectations, the long run, 
the Phillips curve, and the potential and limits of monetary policy all continue to be actively 
researched. Fifty years from now, our knowledge about each of these topics will surely be 
different, and we hope better, but we are willing to bet they will remain central topics in 
macroeconomics.  
In the near future, the meager economic growth since the 2008-09 recession may lead to a 
reexamination of Friedman’s natural-rate hypothesis. At this point, the simplest explanation is 
that this stagnation is due to a slowdown in productivity unrelated to the business cycle.  
Alternatively, however, it might contradict Friedman’s classical view of the long run, either 
because hysteresis effects set in after large recessions or because the economy can suffer from a 
chronic shortage of aggregate demand (as Blanchard discusses in this issue).  
Either way, the Phillips curve has come a long way since A. W. Phillips first plotted the 
unemployment rate against the change in nominal wages using British data. As a scatter plot, it 
has shifted so often that no one takes it to be anything other than a transitory, reduced-form 
empirical relation. Yet as a synonym for nominal rigidities, in the sense of a structural two-way 
causal relation between nominal and real variables in the short run, the Phillips curve is as alive 
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as ever. Much recent research has embraced Keynes’s vision of focusing on how wages and 
prices are set at the micro level, both in theory and in the data. Future work might do well to re-
embrace Friedman’s vision and turn to modeling expectations instead to better understand the 
Phillips curve (Mankiw and Reis 2002).  
Focusing on expectations is especially promising in light of the active work in the area 
(Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Kumar 2017). On the side of theory, researchers are using 
insights from behavioral economics about the ways people go about crafting their expectations 
together with the formalism provided by measures of limited information flows borrowed from 
computer science (Mankiw and Reis 2010, Sims 2010). On the side of data, there are a growing 
number of surveys on people’s expectations, field experiments that show how news spreads in 
networks of people, and laboratory data on the formation of perceptions. The road ahead lies in 
combining the two to provide a better benchmark model of expectations that can replace both 
adaptive and rational expectations (Woodford 2013). 
In addition, the role of monetary policy is in flux today and has drifted quite far from the 
topics that Friedman emphasized in his presidential address. The overall design of central banks 
does not just merit discussion but is also the subject of revisions in practice (Reis 2013). The 
road ahead will likely lead to progress in four areas: the interaction between fiscal and monetary 
policy, the role of bank reserves, near-zero interest rates, and financial stability. 
Friedman discussed fiscal policy in the presidential address only briefly by condemning 
the “cheap money policies after the war” for producing inflation in their futile attempt to keep 
interest payments on the debt low. Otherwise, fiscal authorities are largely ignored. Current 
research instead emphasizes that central banks cannot live in isolation from fiscal authorities. On 
the one hand, central banks are fiscal agents. Their choices have consequences for what the fiscal 
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authorities can achieve and for the fiscal burden they face (Reis 2017). On the other hand, fiscal 
authorities affect financial stability through implicit guarantees that encourage risky behavior, 
can smooth or enhance the business cycle by alternating between stimulus and austerity, and can 
put pressure on inflation through unsustainable fiscal policy (Sims 2013). Discussions of 
monetary policy today often include their fiscal dimensions, even if briefly, but this was not the 
case in most of Friedman’s address. 
As central banks focus on interest rates and the use of currency declines, the old 
monetarism that emphasized the medium of exchange seems outdated. But, in its place, a new 
monetarism is being built on the role of liquidity in financial markets and on the role that 
reserves play in these markets. This work builds on the fact that at the end of 2015, US banks 
held twice as much in reserves issued by the central bank as they did in government bonds issued 
by the Treasury (Reis 2016). Reserves are one of the largest homogeneous financial assets today, 
and the central bank can control both the interest it pays on them as well as their quantity 
independently. “Reservism” may become the new face of monetarism, not as a policy target but 
as an approach to inflation and as a guide for central banks for their “quantitative easing” 
policies and other uses of the central bank balance sheet (Benigno and Nistico 2015). 
Friedman had studied the Great Depression extensively, and his views on monetary 
policy were deeply influenced by this experience. It is therefore surprising that the challenges of 
near-zero interest rates receive scant attention in his presidential address. Implicitly, Friedman 
seemed to dismiss the Keynesian views that the power of monetary policy is compromised when 
interest rates are near zero or that this requires the use of different monetary policy tools. Recent 
research on monetary policy takes a different perspective. It emphasizes that there is a lower 
bound on interest rates (slightly below zero) that puts a constraint on monetary policy, and 
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suggests using forward guidance policies to overcome it or raising the inflation target to reduce 
its occurrence (Eggertsson and Woodford 2003). Some go as far as suggest radical changes to the 
monetary system, such as abolishing currency or introducing dual currencies, to deal with the 
constraint posed by the zero lower bound (Agarwal and Kimball 2015, Rogoff 2017). This 
research suggests that if real interest rates remain as low as they currently are for long, monetary 
policy in the future may look very different from the one that Friedman considered (Eggertsson 
and Mehrotra 2014). 
Finally, Friedman was an expert on financial crises, yet in an address on monetary policy, 
he chose to ignore the interaction between monetary policy and financial stability. Of course, it 
had long been recognized that as the lender of last resort, the central bank has some 
responsibility for financial stability. Yet any desire to tightly control the level of asset prices is 
foolish for all the reasons that Friedman explained in his address, especially when applied to 
stock prices or house prices (Brunnermeier and Schnabel 2016). Friedman would have been 
likewise skeptical about the current foray of central banks into macroprudential regulation (the 
use of financial regulatory tools to promote macroeconomic goals); the presidential address does 
not have a single word on regulation as a task for monetary policy. After almost a decade of 
research onto financial crises, the current consensus in the literature seems to be that central 
banks should pay close attention to credit and funding variables in an attempt to forecast and 
prevent financial crises, should take into account the effect of their actions on financial 
intermediaries, and at times should use financial regulation to intervene directly when doing so 
would promote financial and macroeconomic stability (Adrian and Shin 2008, Brunnermeier and 
Sannikov 2013).  There remain many hard questions about the role that central banks should play 
and about how much we should expect from these important institutions. But in the spirit of 
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Milton Friedman’s presidential address, we suspect that it would be best for central bankers to 
remain humble in what they aspire to achieve. 
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